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OBLIGATIONS
Bruce V. Schewe* and
Robert L. Theriot**

LEGISLATION

Prescription of Claims Against Joint Tortfeasors
During the 1988 session, the legislature once again turned its :-ttention
to the nature of the liability of joint tortfeasors.1 In 1987, the legislature
amended and reenacted article 2324 of the Civil Code, imposing joint
rather than solidary liability on joint tortfeasors other than those who
conspire to cause harm. 2 As noted in the discussion of that amendment
in last year's symposium, the legislature suppressed the attendant effects
of solidarity by defining joint tortfeasors as joint obligors.3 One of these
effects, the rule that an act sufficient to interrupt prescription against
one joint tortfeasor is effective against all, was reinstated in 1988.

Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

Member, Louisiana State and New Orleans Bar Associations, Lecturer on Civil
Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana.
**
Member, Louisiana State and New Orleans Bar Associations.
1. For a discussion of the action taken by the legislature in this field last year, see
Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987-Obligations, 48 La. L. Rev. 423 (1987).
2. La. Civ. Code art. 2324 (as amended and reenacted by 1988 La. Acts 373):
A. He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful
act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such
act.
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, or as otherwise provided
by law, then liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be
solidary only to the extent necessary for the person suffering injury, death, or
loss to recover fifty percent of his recoverable damages; however, when the
amount of recovery has been reduced in accordance with the preceding article,
a judgment debtor shall not be liable for more than the degree of his fault to
a judgment creditor to whom a greater degree of fault has been attributed.
Under the provisions of this Article, all parties shall enjoy their respective rights
of indemnity and contribution. Except as described in Paragraph A of this
Article, or as otherwise provided by law, and hereinabove, the liability for
damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint, divisible obligation,
and a joint tortfeasor shall not be solidarily liable with any other person for
damages attributable to the fault of such other person, including the person
suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless of such other person's insolvency,
ability to pay, degree of fault, or immunity by statute or otherwise.
3. Schewe, supra note 1, at 425.
*
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Act 430 of 1988 added paragraph C to article 2324:
Interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor,
whether the obligation is considered joint and divisible or solidary, is effective against all joint tortfeasors. Nothing in this
Subsection shall be construed to affect in any manner the application of the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.41(G).
Under this amendment, nonconspiratorial joint tortfeasors remain joint
obligors but they are now expressly subject to the same mechanisms of
interrupting prescription as are solidary obligors.4 Although the legislation is straightforward, it does raise a few issues that deserve mention.
The revisions of article 2324 raise an interesting question of retroactivity: whether the 1988 revision should apply retroactively to all
cases governed by the 1987 revision. Paragraph B of article 2324, added
by Act 373 of 1987, became effective on September 1, 1987,1 and,
according to a recent court decision, 6 govems any delict occurring after
that date. Consequently, a delict occurring after September 1, 1987, will
not create a solidary obligation and, putting aside for a moment the
effect of article 2324(C), a suit filed against one tortfeasor should not
interrupt prescription against other joint tortfeasors.
Victims of delicts that occurred after September 9, 1987, may be
able to take advantage of the protection afforded by article 2324(C).
Although paragraph C may not have been effective when the delict
occurred, the one-year prescriptive period 7 for a delict that occurred
after September 9, 1987, would not expire until after September 9, 1988,
the effective date of the amendment. 8 Arguably, a suit filed anytime
within this one-year period against one joint tortfeasor should be effective
against all of them. This result should follow because the interruption
of prescription occasioned by the filing or pendency of the suit 9 will
extend beyond the effective date of article 2324(C).
For victims of delicts that occurred between September 1 and September 9, 1987, the application of article 2324(C) is more problematic.
A claim that arose during this period may have prescribed before the

4. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1799 & 3503.
5. Because Act 373 of 1987, amending and reenacting Louisiana Civil Code article
2324(B), did not specify an effective date, Louisiana Constitution article 3, § 19 provides
that it became operative on the sixtieth day after the end of 1987 legislative session
(September 1, 1987).
6. Adamson v. City of Lafayette, 521 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 526 So. 2d 798 (1988).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
8. Act 430 of 1988, which added Civil Code article 2324(C), also did not specify
an effective date and, accordingly, became operative on the sixtieth day after the end of
the 1988 legislative session (September 9, 1988). See supra note 5.
9. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3462 & 3463.
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effective date of article 2324(C). Thus, even if the victim commenced
a timely suit against one joint tortfeasor, because any cause of action
he might have had against the others would have prescribed before
article 2324(C) became effective, the filing of the suit would not operate
to interrupt prescription against all. The retroactive operation of article
2324(C) would cure this problem, and statutes that lengthen prescriptive
periods are generally applied retroactively. It is, however, uncertain at
this point whether the courts will use article 2324(C) to resurrect claims
that arose, could have been sued upon, and would have prescribed
before the effective date of its enactment, 0 although this result would
not inequitably affect a tortfeasor against whom prescription has not
been tolled and would be consistent with the remedial spirit of Act 430.
The express provision that paragraph C of article 2324 is not to
apply to Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.41(G), part of the Medical
Malpractice Act, raises another question regarding the 1987 change to
article 2324." Essentially, section 1299.41(G) provides that, when a claim
against a qualified health care provider is filed with a medical review
panel, prescription is suspended against all other solidarily liable health
care providers. Although this section should be applied without respect
to paragraph C of article 2324, references to paragraphs A and B of
article 2324 may be proper.1 2 If paragraph B of article 2324 were invoked,
section 1299.41(G) would have no effect at all, for that section suspends
prescription only against health care providers who are solidarily liable.
Unless it results in a breach of contract, medical malpractice gives rise
to a delictual obligation, 3 one that is not likely to be solidary under
the 1987 amendment to article 2324(B). Thus, under article 2324 and
section 1299.41(G), as presently worded, a medical malpractice claimant
who files a demand against a qualified health care provider in a medical
review panel proceeding may not be able to rely upon that demand to
suspend or interrupt prescription against other potentially liable health

10. Statutes modifying periods of repose generally are given retroactive effect upon
the premise that they are procedural or remedial in nature. See La. Civ. Code art. 6,
comment (d); Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521 (La. 1979). The jurisprudence on the subject,
however, appears to have considered only the choice of applying the law in effect at the
time the cause of action arose or the law in effect at the time the suit was filed. E.g.,
Barfield v. Barfield, 483 So. 2d 1085, 1089 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986). Apparently, no
court in Louisiana has yet confronted a case in which it was necessary to apply a statute
affecting prescription that was enacted after the filing of the suit.
11. Although the "interruption" provisions of article 2324(C) appear different from
the "suspension" tenets of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.41(G), the distinction went
unnoticed in at least one case. Ferguson v. Lankford, 374 So. 2d 1205, 1208 (La. 1979).
12. Presumably, the words "this Subsection" in article 2324(C) refer to paragraph
(C) and not the entire article.
13. La. R.S. 40:1299.41(A)(8) (1977 & Supp. 1988).
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care providers who are not joined in that claim or sued separately in
court.
Employer's Right to Contribution or Indemnity Against Employee
Besides addressing problems associated with the prescription of claims
against joint tortfeasors, the legislature, during the past session, attempted to correct difficulties that have arisen in a quite different area
of the law of obligations, namely, the right of an employer who has
been held liable for the negligence of an employee to sue that employee
for contribution or indemnification. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3921,
as enacted in 1984, precluded a derivatively responsible employer from
obtaining indemnification or contribution from a primarily liable employee when that employee had received a "remission, transaction, com4
promise, or other conventional discharge" from the damaged creditor.'
In Barbin v. State, 5 discussed last year, the first circuit held that this
statute did not prevent an employer from recovering indemnification
from an employee when both were cast in judgment. As the court
correctly observed, section 3921 protected the employee from claims for
indemnification only if he entered into a "transaction or compromise
or conventional discharge with the damaged creditor.' 1 6 In 1988 the
legislature negated this holding. The full text of paragraph A of the
statute, with the modifications highlighted, now reads as follows:
Nothwithstanding any provision in Title III of Code Book
III of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 to the
contrary, every master or employer is answerable for the damage
occasioned by his servant or employee in the exercise of the
functions in which they are employed. Any remission, transaction, compromise, or other conventional discharge in favor of
the employee, or any judgment rendered against him for such
damage shall be valid as between the damaged creditor and the
employee, and the employer shall have no right of contribution,
division, or indemnification from the employee nor shall the
employer be allowed to bring any incidental action under the
provisions of Chapter 6 of Title I of Book II of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure against such employee. 17
The change in the language of section 3921, in apparent response to
Barbin, suggests the legislature has decided that an employer who is
liable and is compelled to pay because of an employee's negligence

14.
15.
16.
17.

La. R.S. 9:3921 (Supp. 1988 & as amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 401).
506 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
Id.at 894.
La. R.S. 9:3921(A), as amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 401.
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should not have a demand for indemnification. But if this speculation
is accurate, the legislature's task is not complete: the right to indemnification when the employee neither joins in the suit nor settles with
the creditor still remains.
As a consequence, both the employer and the employee may be
forced into anomalous positions in the face of a claim against one or
both of them. Although the derivatively liable employer is interested in
receiving indemnification, he will not want an employee in the creditor's
lawsuit because a judgment against the employee will destroy his claim
for reimbursement. The employee faces another dilemma: if he is sued
by the creditor, he escapes liability to his employer; but if he is not
joined by the creditor, he may be sued later by his employer. Thus,
oddly, the employee may wish to be named as a defendant in the
litigation; if he is cast in judgment with his employer, and the creditor
seeks and obtains satisfaction of the judgment from the employer first,
he will avoid liability altogether. In that event the employee will have
the best of both worlds: the creditor, because the employer will have
paid the judgment, will not be able to collect from him, and the
employer, by virtue of section 3921, will be barred from seeking indemnification or contribution.
JURISPRUDENCE

During the past year the reported decisions treated a number of
subjects within the law of obligations, including cause,"t novation,' 9
contract formation,20 conditions, 21 compensation, 22 stipulations pour au-

18. E.g., Lauer v. Catalanotto, 522 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
19. E.g., C & A Tractor Co. v. Branch, 520 So. 2d 909, 910 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1987) ("Under La. C.C. art. 1881, a novation takes place when the parties expressly
declare their intention to extinguish the original obligation ... and substitute a new
obligation .. ").
20. E.g., O'Neal v. Chris Steak House, Inc., 525 So. 2d 325, 327 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1988); Merchants Trust & Say. Bank v. Olano, 512 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1987) ("A promise to pay money need not be in writing unless it is a promise to
pay the debt of a third person.").
21. E.g., O'Neal v. Chris Steak House, Inc., 525 So. 2d 325, 328 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1988) ("[Aln obligor cannot be permitted to benefit from his having prevented the
fulfillment of the condition upon which his obligation rests and that in such instance the
condition is to be considered fulfilled. LSA-C.C. art. 2040 (1870); Moss v. Guarisco, 459
So. 2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 1247 (La. 1985).").
22. E.g., Mega Transp., Inc. v. Kieffer, 526 So. 2d 460, 462 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1988) ("The jurisprudence has established that for set-off to be applicable there must be
the contemporaneous existence of distinct debts that are equally liquidated and demandable.
Beninate v. Licata, 473 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985), writ denied, 477 So. 2d
1124 (La. 1985)."); Powerhouse Wholesale Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Spartan Bldg. Corp.,
525 So. 2d 1216, 1221 (La. App. IstCir. 1988) ("[Flor compensation to be applicable,
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trui, 23 proof of agreements, 24 solidarity, 25 compromises, 26 subrogation,",
lesion, 2 revocation of agreements, 2 9 performance, 3 0 interference with con-

tract rights," accord and satisfaction,32 and interpretation of agreements."a The more significant or the more unusual of the opinions are
noted in the following discussion.

two distinct debts, equally liquidated and demandable, must exist contemporaneously.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Southern Excavation, Inc., 480 So. 2d
920 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), writs denied, 481 So. 2d 1337 and 1339 (La. 1986)."); Sims
v. Hays, 521 So. 2d 730, 733 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988) ("A claim is liquidated when the
debt is for an amount capable of ascertainment by mere calculation in accordance with
accepted legal standards. Olinde Hardware & Supply v. Ramsey, 98 So. 2d 835 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957); Coburn v. Comm'l Nat'l Bank, 453 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984),
writ denied 457 So. 2d 681 (La. 1984). Aubry and Rau define a liquid debt as one whose
existence is certain and its quantity determined.").
23. E.g., Spears v. McCormick & Co., 520 So. 2d 805, 812 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987),
writ denied, 522 So. 2d 563 (1988) ("The fact that a third party may incidentally derive
a benefit from a contract does not necessarily create a stipulation pour autrui. State Farm
Fire and Casualty v. Williams, 486 So. 2d 849, 851 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).).
24. E.g., Frank v. Motwani, 513 So. 2d 1170 (La. 1987); Swindell v. Bulger, 526
So. 2d 422, 424 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) ("[S]ince construction contracts do not have
to be in writing in this state, written construction contracts may be modified by oral
agreement and by the conduct of the parties, even when the written contract provides
that all change orders must be in writing. Pelican Electrical Contractors v. Neumeyer,
419 So. 2d 1, 5 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1150 (La. 1982).").
25. E.g., Travis v. Hudnall, 517 So. 2d 1085 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
26. E.g., Willett v. Price, 515 So. 2d 477 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 516
So. 2d 367 (1988).
27. E.g., Smith v. Manville Forest Prod. Corp., 521 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 522 So. 2d 570 (1988).
28. E.g., Nation v. Wilmore, 525 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) ("In
an action for lesion beyond moiety, the vendor must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the price given was less than one-half of the value of the thing sold. LSAC.C. arts. 2589, 2591; Bisco v. Middleton, 383 So. 2d 1047 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
The standard to be applied to determine the value of the property is the fair market
value at the time of the sale. LSA-C.C. art. 2590; Goulas v. Goulas, 426 So. 2d 735
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1983)."); Landry v. Istre, 510 So. 2d 1310, 1314-15 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1987).
29. E.g., Frank v. Motwani, 513 So. 2d 1170 (La. 1987).
30. E.g., Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 800 (1988).
31. E.g., Professional Answering Serv., Inc. v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 521 So.
2d 549, 551 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (" 'Forcum-James [Co. v. Duke Transportation
Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 228 (1957)] appears to establish the dogmatic rule that there
is no cause of action for tortious (intentional or negligent) interference with contracts.'
...
We concluded, reluctantly, that Forcum-James had not been overruled by PPG
Industries [Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984)] ..
") (quoting Community
Coffee Co. v. Tri-Parish Const. & Materials, Inc., 490 So. 2d 1109 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1986).).
32. E.g., Barras v. Breaux, 526 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (dation en
paiement is an accord and satisfaction or a compromise).
33. E.g., Ciaccio v. Cazayoux, 519 So. 2d 799, 802 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) ("[C]ourts
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Lawful Cause and Objects for Contracts

From time to time, courts have questioned the validity of the lawfulness of the cause or the object of an agreement. 3 4 These matters
historically have involved prostitution 35 or gambling. 36 Lauer v. Catalanotto,31 seems to fall in the latter category. A more exacting review

of the case, however, is in order.
Mr. Lauer sued Mr. Catalanotto for breach of contract, contending

that they had combined in a joint venture for the purpose of gambling.3"
According to Mr. Lauer, the details of the agreement were as follows:
(i) Mr. Catalanotto was to travel to Las Vegas, Nevada to participate

in games of chance for a period of four to five days; (ii) Mr. Catalanotto
was to put $10,000 at risk in this enterprise; and (iii) Mr. Lauer, who
was to be at Las Vegas at the same time as Mr. Catalanotto, would

absorb one-half of any of the losses and would receive one-half of any
of the winnings. 39 Mr. Lauer urged in his petition that Mr. Catalanotto
won $16,000 as a result of his gaming activities, but then refused to
turn over Mr. Lauer's share. For his part, Mr. Catalanotto denied these
40
assertions .

are bound to give legal effect to all written contracts according to the true intent of the
parties and this intent is to be determined by the words of the contract when these are
clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd consequences. LSA-C.C. arts. 2045, 2046; Leenerts
Farms, Inc. v. Rogers, 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).").
34. E.g., A Better Place, Inc. v. Gianni Inv. Co., 445 So. 2d 728 (La. 1984) (drug
paraphernalia); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 443 So. 2d 1122 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206, 104 S. Ct. 2389 (1984)
(meretricious services). See Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Obligations, 45
La. L. Rev. 447, 451-53 (1984).
35. E.g., Rosenblath v. Sanders, 150 La. 882, 91 So. 2d 252 (1922).
36. E.g., Martin v. Seabaugh, 128 La. 442, 54 So. 935 (1911); Lamy v. Will, 140
So. 2d 794 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
37. 522 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
38. Id. at 657.
39. Id.
40. As stated by the court,
In his answer, defendant asserted that plaintiff had approached him about
entering into a "cow" in which they would both put up an equal amount of
money, with defendant doing the gambling and the two sharing in the profits
and/or losses in the "cow." Defendant alleged that upon arriving in Las Vegas,
plaintiff decided not to enter the "cow" with defendant; that plaintiff did not
mention it further; that defendant made a $1,300 personal loan to plaintiff and
that plaintiff made no reference to the "cow."
Defendant reconvened for
repayment of the alleged loan and also sought damages for defamation, alleging
plaintiff had "slandered the name of [defendant] all over this town calling him
various and sundry names ***."
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Prior to trial, Mr. Catalanotto moved for a summary judgment on
the ground that article 2983 of the Civil Code4 forbids the recovery of
gaming debts. The district court denied the motion for two reasons:
first, a material issue of fact existed whether the litigants entered into
the agreement described by Mr. Lauer; and second, Mr. Lauer was not
prohibited, as a matter of law, from prevailing on the debt "because
the gambling took place in Las Vegas, where gambling is legal." '42 At
the trial of the matter, the district court concluded that it had "no
doubt that plaintiff thought he had an agreement, ' 43 but that he, nevertheless, had not satisfactorily proved the existence of the contract.
Mr. Lauer appealed.
The fifth circuit, in reversing the judgment, explained its rationale
as follows:
We find plaintiff's petition failed to state a cause of action
because recovery of gambling debts is specifically prohibited by
Article 2983 of the Civil Code ....
[Tihe fact that the gambling
took place in a state in which it is legal does not grant plaintiff
a remedy to recovery such monies under Louisiana Law. Louisiana public policy traditionally has considered gaming contra
bonos mores and our state constitution has long directed the
legislature to suppress gambling. 44
Insofar as the court simply recited the maxim that gaming contracts are
not enforceable under the law of Louisiana, it certainly blazed no new
path. The court's interpretation of Louisiana law was both consistent
with prior jurisprudence and correct.
What is interesting about the decision is not what the court said,
but rather what it omitted. The court wholly overlooked the question
of what substantive law governed the purported agreement between Mr.
Lauer and Mr. Catalanotto. The factual recitation by the court does
not disclose any of the information pertinent to that inquiry, for example:
(i) where the parties were located at the time they confected their
agreement; (ii) whether either or both Mr. Lauer or Mr. Catalanotto

La. Civ. Code art. 2983 reads as follows:
The law grants no action for the payment of what has been won at gaming
or by a bet, except for games tending to promote skill in the use of arms,
such as the exercise of the gun and foot, horse and chariot racing.
42. 522 So. 2d at 657.
43. Id. The appellate panel stated that "[tlhe judge relied on the testimony of a
third party who stated he had overheard the parties' conversation prior to the Las Vegas
trip, that . . . 'defendant did not accept or reject' the offer." Id. The district court also
granted judgment on the reconventional demand.
44. Id. at 657-58 (citing La. Const. art 7, § 6; La. Const. art. 9, § 8 (1921); La.
R.S. 14:90 (1986)).
41.
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whether the parties intended the
are domiciliaries of Louisiana; and (iii)
45
law of Nevada to control their pact.
Depending upon further development of the evidence, it may be
concluded that the fundamental issue that requires decision is of jurisdiction over the subject matter-whether, in light of article 2983, Louisiana courts provide an available forum in which to bring a claim based
upon the law of another State (in this instance Nevada), when the
foreign law is repugnant to the public policy of this state. This examination, however, directs only a dismissal of the suit for want of
jurisdiction and will not produce a decision on the merits (the validity
46
of the agreement that forms the subject matter of the litigation).
Assuming that the alleged contract between Mr. Lauer and Mr. Catalanotto was formed under and is governed by the laws of Nevada, then
the court simply should not have ruled upon the enforceability of their
agreement; it should have declined to hear their dispute. The issues in
this conflict of laws scenario 47 are complex and a full treatment of them
is beyond the scope of this portion of the symposium. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that if Mr. Lauer could have obtained personal jurisdiction over and sued Mr. Catalanotto in the court system of Nevada,
a final judgment, rendered in his favor and made executory in Louisiana,
would have been enforceable against Mr. Catalanotto by virtue of the
48
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States.
Subrogation
In the past the courts questioned whether an insurer is legally
49
subrogated to the rights of its insured upon payment of the claim.

45. See Louisiana Conflicts Jurisprudence: Contracts Symposium, 47 La. L. Rev.
1181, 1196-1211 (1987) (hereinafter "Contracts Symposium"); see also Beale, What Law
Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 260 (1909).
46. Inherent in this is a word-by-word review of the beginning of the text of article
It may be that "[t]he law" refers to the judicial
2983-"[t]he law grants no action ....
system, as established by the state constitution, the substantive law, and the Code of
Civil Procedure and its ancillaries. Thus, even if the agreement by and between Mr. Lauer
and Mr. Catalanotto is controlled by the laws of Nevada and is lawful, it could not be
enforced through the courts of Louisiana. Alternatively, "[tihe law grants no action"
may be the expression of the legislature that the courts of this State are open to present
demands arising out of gaming arrangements but that agreements of this sort are invalid
substantively, to the extent not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States,
regardless of the laws of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions where they were confected or
had effect. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
47. See Contracts Symposium, supra note 45, at 1196-1211.
48. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641 (1908).
49. [T]he issue of legal suborgation of an insurer to the rights of its insured
against a tortfeasor upon payment of the claim of the insured is not only a
mystery in the law of Louisiana but is mired in a Serbonian bog, using the
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Eventually, that issue was resolved in favor of the insurer.5 0 During the
past year, however, the second circuit court of appeal correctly declined
to allow legal or conventional subrogation of an insurer to the rights
of its insured prior to full satisfaction of the insured's losses." In so
ruling, the court in Smith v. Manville Forest Products Corp.12 did not
permit the insurer to compete with the insured with respect to recovery.
Although the background of the case is complicated, the significant
events may be set forth as follows. Mr. Smith's wife and son were

injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of Lori
Patten. At the time of the accident, Mr. Smith, an employee of Manville
Forest Products Corporation ("Manville"), and his family participated
in a health care plan administered by an affiliate of Manville. Mr. Smith
submitted to Manville a statement of the medical expenses that resulted
from the injuries to his child. He then secured court approval to enter
into a compromise agreement with Ms. Patten and her liability insurer
on behalf of his son, and received the full coverage of $10,000. Manville
refused to pay any expenses until Mr. Smith signed a "Right of Reimbursement Agreement." 53 Mr. Smith executed this document, reserving
inimitable prose of Justice Cardozo, Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499, 54 S. Ct. 461, 463 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
Professor Johnson waxed eloquent on the subject in this symposium a few years
ago, and his thoughts are recommended .... Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Obligations, 39 La. L. Rev.
675, 675-85 (1979).
Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985-Obligations, 46 La. L. Rev. 595, 607
(1986).
50. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Naquin, 488 So. 2d 950 (La. 1986). See Schewe, Developments
in the Law, 1985-1986-Obligations, 47 La. L. Rev. 377, 383 (1986).
51. Smith v. Manville Forest Prod. Corp., 521 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 522 So. 2d 570 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Section 7.08 of the "Right of Reimbursement Agreement" reads as follows:
Subrogation
If a Participant is injured through the alleged act or omission of another person,
the benefits shall be provided only if the Employee or adult Dependent shall
agree in writing.
(a) to reimburse this Plan for the amount of benefits provided immediately
upon collection of damages, if any, whether by legal action, settlement
or otherwise;
(b) to the extent that collection of damages is sought through any means,
to provide this Plan with a lien and order directing reimbursement of
medical payments, not to exceed the amount of benefits provided by this
Plan. The lien and order may be filed with the person whose act caused
the injuries, his agent or carrier, the court or the attorney of the Employee.
This Plan or its authorized agents including the Administrator, shall have
the right to intervene in any suit or other proceeding to protect the
reimbursement rights hereunder. This Plan shall be responsible for its
attorneys fees.
Id.at 774.
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all rights against his own uninsured/underinsured ("UM") carrier. Mr.
Smith then entered into a court-approved settlement with his UM carrier
on behalf of his son, receiving $24,500 of the $25,000 coverage under
the policy. When Mr. Smith submitted additional claims to Manville,
it refused to make further payments and demanded reimbursement of
the $10,377.78 it previously had paid. At this point Mr. Smith sought
a declaratory judgment that Manville was not entitled to "reimbursement
or subrogation from the insurance proceeds." '5 4 Manville answered and,
via a reconventional demand, sought a money judgment for the sums
already paid. The district court, presumably overlooking the principle
embodied in article 1826 of the Civil Code, that an insurer's subrogation
is not to injure the insured, granted a motion for summary judgment
in favor of Manville, concluding that the "Subrogation" provision of
the "Right of Reimbursement Agreement" not only established a right
of subrogation against third persons but required "the insured participant
to reimburse the plan [by direct payment] in the event of any recovery.""
On appeal, as before the district court, Mr. Smith contended that
his son's damages exceeded the available insurance and that the "Subrogation" clause, because it provided for conventional subrogation, was
inoperative until his son, the subrogor, was fully compensated. The
appellate court, assuming for the purposes of the appeal that the "plaintiff's son's damages exceeded the available amount of insurance proceeds, ' 5 6 reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for a
determination of whether the son had been fully compensated. In its
discussion, largely centering on the distinction between reimbursement
and subrogation clauses in insurance agreements, the court made the
following remark of importance regarding conventional subrogation:
An insurer that makes payment to its insured may enforce a
conventional subrogation agreement contained in its policy. However, subrogation cannot injure the insured, and if he has been
paid only in part for his damages, he may exercise his right
7
for what remains due in preference to his insurer.1
The soundness of the second circuit's conclusion may be demonstrated through a few short illustrations. Suppose A is the insurer, B
is the insured, and C is the tortfeasor. By reason of C's negligence, B
suffers damages of $50,000. C pays B $30,000, A pays B $20,000, and

54. Id.
55. Id.at 775.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing La. Civ. Code art. 1826; Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Sonnier, 406 So. 2d 178 (La. 1981); Carter v. Bordelon, 370 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1979); Legendre v. Rodrigue, 358 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 359
So. 2d 1293 (1978)).
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A then is subrogated to B's rights" against C (in order to proceed
against C for indemnification 9). This is as it should be. C, the wrongdoer, ultimately pays $50,000 (the total loss), A is fully compensated,
and B loses nothing. But suppose that C pays $10,000 and A pays B
$20,000. In that case, B, though he has sustained a loss of $50,000,
will have received only $30,000 from both A and C. Thus, A should
have no claim against C until either A or C pays B another $20,000.
This is the result dictated by article 1826 of the Civil Code. 60 Of course,
a different situation altogether is presented if A pays B $20,000 and C
pays B $50,000. Then C has satisfied B's demand and A should be
entitled to the return of $20,000 from B. In light of these hypotheticals,
it appears that the decision in Smith v. Manville Forest Products Corp.
is both fair in its result and sound in its reasoning.

Defenses to Performance
The case of Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc.61 is noteworthy because the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal, in the
context of a "take-or-pay ' 6 gas contract dispute, refused to adopt either

58. The insurer must be wary, however, particularly if the insured has released the
tortfeasor. "Subrogation is subrogation ... whether conventional or legal, it does no
more than place the person subrogated into the position of the original creditor." Jilek
v. Covert, 465 So. 2d 102, 103 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). See Reliance
Ins. Co. v. Tadlock, 420 So. 2d 548, 549 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982) ("It is well settled
that a subrogee can have no greater rights than the subrogor and acquires only those
rights held by the subrogor as of the time of payment.").
59. La. Civ. Code art. 1804:
Among solidary obligors, each is liable for his virile portion. If the obligation
arises from a contract or quais-contract, virile portions are equal in the absence
of agreement or judgment to the contrary. If the obligation arises from an
offense or quasi-offense, a virile portion is proportionate to the fault of each
obligor.
A solidary obligor who has rendered the whole performance, though subrogated
to the right of the obligee, may claim from the other obligors no more than
the virile portion of each.
If the circumstances giving rise to the solidary obligation concern only one
of the obligors, that obligor is liable for the whole to the other obligors who
are then considered only as his sureties.
60. In part, article 1826 states that "[a]n original obligee who has been paid only
in part may exercise his right for the balance of the debt in preference to the new
obligee." Amplifying upon this notion, comment (e) to article 1826 provides the following:
"If the subrogee pays only a part of the obligor's debt, the original obligee retains the
right to be paid the balance by the obligor. This right takes precedence over that of the
subrogee to collect the portion that he paid .. "
61. 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 800 (1988).
62. The appellate panel quoted from the opinion of the district court in this matter
in describing the nature of the agreement:
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the French theory of imprevision or the common law doctrine of commercial impracticability in order to reform the contract. 63 Both of these
concepts deserve a brief review.
The theory of imprevision has its origins in the public law of France,
developed through the administrative tribunals shortly after the outbreak
of World War I. In the seminal matter, the Conseil d'Etat afforded a
utility company relief from certain terms in a contract with a municipality
that had been entered into prior to the War, based upon the drastic
turn of events. 64 The tribunal, reasoning that the utility company should
not be held to the provisions of the agreement as long as the extraordinary situation existed, granted the petition. Accordingly, the administrative court ordered the municipality to defray a portion of contractual
charges that otherwise would have been due.
Since its debut in France, the theory of imprevision has been used
only by administrative panels and has been limited to public law contracts, typically agreements between utilities and municipalities. The Cour
de Cassation, the chief French judicial body (or court of law), has
refused to extend the boundaries of the doctrine. 65 Several scholars have
noted why the Cour de Cassation has refused to invoke imprevision in
nonadministrative matters, including the following: the judicial courts
may be concerned that the excuse of imprevision would encourage bad
faith behavior of contracting parties and, therefore, result in an aggravation of the economic life of the community; because of the drastic
intrusion of the courts into contractual affairs inherent in the application
of the doctrine and because the relief is contrary to general civilian
principles, the judicial courts believe that only the legislature should
authorize this type of defense; and the doctrine is contrary to the civil
law tradition of respecting the intentions of the parties as expressed

Historically Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized these type of requirements
contracts which have been viewed as a veritable constitution between the parties
to govern future sales. See 6 S. Litvinoff, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise § 119
n.32, § 284 n.47 (1969); Hopkins, 49 Tulane Law Review 605 (1975). In fact,
take-or-pay provisions are commonplace in the natural gas industry and are not
unconscionable or unfair. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Internorth,
Inc. 595 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Tex. 1984). The Seller's obligation is twofold: (I)
insuring that the buyer receives all the goods he requires and (2) supplying the
goods at the fixed contract price regardless of market fluctuations. The buyer
thereby is assured of his supply and is insulated from increases in the market
price. In return, he assures the seller a ready market for his goods at a fixed
price.
521 So. 2d at 1239.
63. Id. at 1240.
64. Comp. General d'Eclairage de Bordeaux v. Ville de Bordeaux, Cons. d'Etat, 30
Mars 1916, D. 1916 111.25.
65. Smith, Impossibility of Performance as an Excuse in French Law: The Doctrine
of Force Majeure, 45 Yale L.J. 453, 457-58 (1936).
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through their agreements. 66 In short, the theory of imprevision has not
been extended because the public interest demands that respect for
agreements lawfully confected be fortified, not diminished.
Like the courts of law in France, the judiciary in Louisiana has
refused to receive the doctrine of imprevision. No court in Louisiana
has used the doctrine to modify or revise a contract. Indeed, before
Hanover, it had been mentioned only twice-by former Justice Tate in
his dissent in Cryer v. M & M Manufacturing Co.,67 and in Armour
6
v. Shongaloo Lodge No. 352 Free and Accepted Masons.
Furthermore, the court's refusal in Hanover to apply the theory of
imprevision for the purpose of modifying or revising contracts is proper
because the theory is in diametrical conflict with Louisiana Civil Code
articles 198369 and 2046.70 The bargain of the parties to a contract forms

66. M. Planiol, G. Ripert & P. Esmein, Droit Civil Franqais at 527-35 (2d ed. 1952).
67. Cryer v. M & M Mfg. Co., 273 So. 2d 818, 830 (La. 1972) (Tate, J., dissenting).
In that case, the majority of the the court recognized the validity of a contract of sale
involving the manufacturing rights to a heater that also included an agreement (i) to
manufacture at least 5,000 heater units and (ii) to pay a royalty on each unit manufactured.
In his dissent to the initial majority opinion, Justice Tate dissected the agreement into
two separate obligations: the sale of the manufacturing rights; and the duties involved in
manufacturing 5,000 units and paying a royalty on each. Justice Tate argued that the
second obligation should be rescinded because of an error operating on the cause. In his
dissent to the per curiam decision on rehearing, Justice Tate again restated his concurrence
with the majority's decision with regard to the contract of sale but added an additional
reason for his dissent with regard to the royalty agreement-that it was a conditional
obligation, the existence of which was dependent upon an event yet to occur. In addition,
Justice Tate mentioned this in passing:
Some reliance might also be placed upon the modern civilian theorie de ('imprevision-the power of the courts to hold negated an obligation when change
of circumstances or impossibility voids the presuppositions or reasonable expectations of the parties although not expressed, which formed an underlying
basis for the agreement.
Id. at 830 (emphasis added). Not only did the majority of the supreme court disagree,
but Justice Tate's own advocacy of this theory, in view of the nature of his comments,
is at best speculative.
68. 342 So. 2d 600 (La. 1977). In Shongaloo Lodge, the supreme court, without
agreeing on the grounds for its ruling, upheld the validity of a contract in the nature of
a lease and granted a reconventional demand for specific performance. In its discussion
regarding the rejection of the demands of the plaintiff, the court enumerated the various
contentions:
We have considered the arguments made, including lack of serious consideration,
prescription against the action in nullity, and the classification of the contract
as a loan for use. We have also considered the applicability of the theory of
imprevision, the judicial revision of contracts.
Id. at 601 (emphasis added). This certainly is short of anything resembling an embrace
of imprevision.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 1983:
Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and may be dissolved only
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their law, and courts should not interfere with freely confected agreements to attempt to fashion a seemingly fair result in a particular
instance.
The doctrine of "commercial impracticability," like the theory of
imprevision, is of relatively recent vintage. Unlike the French theory,
however, this doctrine has received legislative sanction, though not in
Louisiana; nevertheless, because the concept is periodically urged in the
courts of Louisiana a discussion of it and the court's refusal to import
it is appropriate.
Article 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that performance may be suspended when it "has been made impracticable by
the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in
good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid." However,
as the official comments to article 2-615 provide, increased costs alone
do not excuse performance unless those costs are due to an "unforeseen
contingency altering the essential nature of ... performance.' ' 1 Further,
"a rise or collapse in the market itself" provides no excuse since "that
is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at
fixed prices are intended to cover." ' The rationale for these limitations
has been explained as follows:
The strictness of this rule is based on a number of considerations:
the fact, for example, that the very purpose of a fixed price
agreement is to place the risk of increased cost on the promissor
(and the risk of decreased cost on the promisee). Further, enforcing the bargain struck encourages parties to attempt to fore73
see cost variations, and structure their agreements accordingly.
Commercial impracticability differs fundamentally and irreconcilably
from the concept of force majeure, the mechanism of the Civil Code

through the consent of the parties or on grounds provided by law. Contracts
must be performed in good faith.
70. La. Civ. Code art. 2046:
When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd
consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties'
intent.
71. U.C.C. § 2-615, Official Comment 4 (1988).
72. Id.
73. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D. Va. 1981). See
Bernina Distrib., Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Mach. Co., 646 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1981); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062, 98 S. Ct.
1235 (1978); Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co., 256 Or. 539, 474 P.2d 529, 530 (1970) ("A
mere showing of unprofitability without more, will not excuse the performance of a
contract.").
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excusing the failure of a debtor "when it is caused by a fortuitous
event that makes performance impossible." ' 74 Article 2-615 abandons
physical impossibility of performance as the test for excusing performance and substitutes for it the notion of "impracticability." Because
this standard is wholly foreign to the law of Louisiana, the court in
Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco Inc. correctly rejected it.
Oral Modification and Revocation of Writings
In Frank v. MotwanP5 the supreme court had the opportunity to
resolve what should be settled: whether an agreement that must be
evidenced in writing may be modified or revoked orally. Although the
court addressed this issue no less than ten times in the past, it had
failed to provide a definitive answer. 76 Unfortunately, the matter still is
not free from confusion. Rather than resolving the question completely,
the court drew a distinction between modifications and revocations,
addressed the latter, ignored the former, and left the subject muddled.
The cloudiness in this area stems from the case of Salley v. Louviere77
and the query whether a lessor or lessee can prove that a written contract
of lease has been cancelled by oral communications. The intermediate
appellate court concluded that admitting evidence of a subsequent oral
cancellation of a written lease would violate the parol evidence rule set
forth in article 2276 of the Civil Code of 1870.7 In properly rejecting
this view, the supreme court stated that "[ilt is well settled that this
article of the Civil Code does not forbid the proving by parol evidence
of a subsequent agreement to modify or to revoke a written agreement. '79
The court's misstep occurred when it made this similar but slightly
different remark:
This article of the Code [2276] is not to be construed so as to
forbid the proving by parol evidence of a subsequent agreement

74.
75.
76.

See La. Civ. Code art. 1873.
513 So. 2d 1170 (La. 1987).
E.g., Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1979); Torrey v.

Simon-Torrey, Inc., 307 So. 2d 569 (La. 1974) (original hearing); Di Christina v. Weiser,
215 La. 1115, 42 So. 2d 868 (1949); Davidson v. Midstates Oil Corp., 211 La. 882, 31
So. 2d 7 (1947); Tholl Oil Co. v. Miller, 197 La. 976, 3 So. 2d 97 (1941); Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co. v. R. 0. Roy & Co., 196 La. 121, 198 So. 768 (1940); Investors

Homestead Ass'n v. Anglada, 193 La. 596, 192 So. 69 (1939); Conklin v. Caffal, 189
La. 301, 179 So. 434 (1938); Parlor City Lumber Co. v. Sandel, 186 La. 982, 173 So.
737 (1937); Salley v. Louviere, 183 La. 92, 162 So. 811 (1935).
77. 183 La. 92, 162 So. 811 (1935).

78.

Id. at 97-98, 162 So. at 813. See La. Civ. Code art. 2276 (1870):
Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or beyond what is contained
in the acts, nor on what may have been said before, or at the time of making
them, or since.
79. 183 La. at 98-99, 162 So. at 813.
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modifying or abrogating a written contract of a character which
the law does not require to be in writing.""
The difficulty is that the prepositional phrase "of a character which
the law does not require to be in writing" is susceptible of two different
interpretations. First, this language may be read to state that the subsequent agreement must be in writing only if the original agreement is
of a kind required by law to be in writing. On the other hand, the
quoted words may imply that the subsequent agreement must be in
writing only if it is of a kind that the law requires to be written.
Unfortunately, the backdrop of Salley v. Louviere is of little assistance
in determining the correct view; in that case the court addressed an
agreement of lease, a contract that need not be in writing. 8' Nor have
later courts resolved the question, for both perspectives of the quoted
portion of the opinion in Salley find support in the jurisprudence.
In an excellent exposition of the parol evidence rule, the Orleans
appeals court adopted the second interpretation, and wrote the following:
There is nothing sacrosanct about a paper writing which invests
it with solemnity and prevents its modification under some prescribed formalism. It may not be opposed unilaterally by parol. . . . It cannot be contradicted by oral evidence ....
But
oral testimony may be admitted to prove a subsequent agreement
modifying or abrogating its terms. In that case the question is
whether the subsequent convention or agreement is in proper
form and if so it is admissible not to vary the written contract
but as proof of another contract. The principle of law controlling
the situation has no relation to the parol evidence rule but is
based upon estoppel. A privy to an agreement cannot be heard
to deny his connection therewith. 2
To illustrate its view, the court set out a scenario in which A sells a
movable to B via a written agreement. Subsequently, B, seeking to avoid
the contract, receives A's oral assent to the dissolution of the sale and
the return of the movable to A. This second transaction is, in the view
of the court, valid because an agreement transferring title to a movable
need not be in writing, irrespective of its negation of the written contract
that originally existed between A and B. Thus, the court adopted a
position that parol evidence is admissible to show a subsequent agreement
so long as the second agreement need not be in writing to be effective,
and that corresponds to the second interpretation of the statement in
Salley.

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 98, 162 So. at 813 (emphasis added).
La. Civ. Code art. 2683.
Harvey v. Mouncou, 3 La. App. 231, 233 (Orl. 1925).
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In the original hearing of Torrey v. Simon-Torrey, Inc.,83 on the
other hand, the supreme court apparently embraced the first view of
Salley, namely, that proof of an oral agreement to modify or revoke
a written contract is inadmissible, at least when the original agreement
is one that must be in writing.8 4 Complicating the picture, however, is
the granting by the court of a rehearing to examine the issue more
closely. And in the second opinion, the court declined to address the
issue at all, 85 leaving in doubt the weight of its remarks on original
hearing.
Without sure guidance from the supreme court, the first circuit court
86
of appeal confronted the question squarely in Arceneaux v. Adams
and decreed that the parol evidence rule does not apply at all to
subsequent agreements. The court, as a consequence, declared that an
oral agreement to cancel a written contract to buy immovable property
was valid, because there is no requirement that a subsequent agreement
87
of this nature must be in writing.
In Kaplan v. University Lake Corp. ,88 announced the year following
Arceneaux, the supreme court employed similar reasoning. Without mentioning the parol evidence rule, the court determined that the parties to
a written purchase agreement concerning immovable property could cancel the contract orally. 89 In support of this proposition the court relied
upon article 1901 of the Civil Code of 1870: "Agreements legally entered
into have the effect of law on those who form them. They cannot be
revoked unless by mutual consent of the parties, or for causes acknowledged by law. ... "90
Against this jurisprudential background, Frank v. Motwani involved
a purported oral cancellation of an agreement to purchase immovable
property. The buyer urged, in defense to an action demanding a forfeit
of the deposit, that the contract to buy had been terminated with the
consent of all of the parties. In ruling favorably upon a motion for
summary judgment presented by the vendors, the district court held that
the defense of the buyer was not "viable . . . as a matter of law ...

83. 307 So. 2d 569 (La. 1974).
84. Id. at 573 (on original hearing).
85. 307 So. 2d at 580 (on rehearing).
86. 366 So. 2d 1025 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
87. Id.at 1028.
88. 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1979).
89. Id.at 388. The court reasoned that "[a]lthough the promise to sell an immovable
must be in writing, La. Civ. Code art. 2462, there is no requirement that the parties'
mutual consent to revoke a written contract be in writing. La. Civ. Code art. 1901." Id.
at 388 n.6.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 1901 (1870) (emphasis added). Old article 1901 has been
reenacted, without substantive change, as Louisiana Civil Code article 1983.
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"9, The court of appeal affirmed, stating that evidence of "defendant's
claim of an oral agreement to cancel the written purchase agreement is
not admissible, ' 92 and the supreme court "granted certiorari to review
'93
the correctness of that decision."
In reviewing the decisions of the trial and the intermediate appellate
courts, the supreme court could have resolved the matter on the basis
of these established precepts:

(i) that the parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent
agreements (unless, of course, the subsequent agreement must
be written);
(ii) that it is of no moment whether the original agreement is
required to be in writing;
(iii) that a subsequent agreement to cancel an earlier agreement
to purchase an immovable is not required to be in writing; and
(iv) that, therefore, a subsequent oral agreement (if proven) is
sufficient to cancel an agreement to purchase an immovable,
notwithstanding the evidence in writing of the former.
In Frank, an opinion that supports the notion that the parol evidence
rule applies to modifications but not to revocations, the supreme court
stated propositions (iii) and (iv), but omitted (i) and (ii). The court may
have drawn this distinction in an effort to avoid addressing the fourth
circuit's attempted resurrection 94 of the original opinion in Torrey.9'
In explaining its decision in Frank, the supreme court hinged its
analyses upon Kaplan and the revised wording of the parol evidence
rule in article 1848 of the Civil Code. First, the court stated that the
principles of Kaplan controlled and therefore that proof of a subsequent
oral cancellation of a written purchase agreement is admissible-an
agreement to cancel a contract to purchase is not of a nature required
to be in writing. 96 Rather than directly rejecting the fourth circuit's
argument based on Torrey, however, the supreme court concluded that

91. 513 So. 2d at 1171.
92. 503 So. 2d 590, 591 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
93. 513 So. 2d at 1171.
94. 503 So. 2d at 591.
95. The fourth circuit concluded, in reliance on the original opinion in Torrey, that
the parol evidence rule prevented the oral revocation of an agreement required to be in
writing. Torrey v. Simon-Torrey, Inc., 307 So. 2d at 573; see supra notes 83-85 and
accompanying text. In this, the appellate panel erred; the supreme court pronounced in
Kaplan that the validity of a subsequent oral agreement is to be based solely on its
nature, without respect to the parol evidence rule or the formalities demanded of the
original contract.
96. 513 So. 2d at 1172.
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the parol evidence rule was inapplicable on its face.9 7 Second, the court
considered article 1848:
Testimonial or other evidence may not be admitted to negate
or vary the contents of an authentic act or an act under private
signature. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, that evidence
may be admitted to prove such circumstances as a vice of
consent, or a simulation, or to prove that the written act was
modified by subsequent invalid oral agreement.
Applying a purely exegetical approach, the court emphasized the words
"negate," "vary," and "modified" in the legislation:
[I]t addresses the question of whether parol evidence may be
used to prove a verbal modification of a contract. It does not
address the question of whether parol evidence may be used to
prove a verbal cancellation of a contract. Therefore, art. 1848
does not apply here because this case only involves an alleged
98
verbal cancellation, not a modification.
Though it reached the correct result, based upon Kaplan, the court's
treatment of the parole evidence rule is troubling. The text of article
1848 does not compel the conclusion that it governs only modifications
and not revocations. Further, the court's reasoning is not dictated by
earlier jurisprudence, which does not distinguish between modifications
and revocations. 99 Admittedly, the supreme court's approach permitted
it to avoid discrediting whatever remains of Torrey, at least in situations
that involve a revocation, but the court should have offered a clearer
explanation of its rationale for upholding the oral cancellation of the
contract. As a consequence of the court's lack of perspicuity, it remains
uncertain whether modifications of agreements that must be in writing
are controlled by the "rule" of Torrey or by that of Kaplan and Frank.
Perhaps the best guide for future adjudication is provided by Justice
Lemmon's concurrence in Frank. According to Justice Lemmon, the
admissibility of proof of an oral contract that purportedly modifies or
cancels a prior written contract should depend on the requirements of
form for the modification or cancellation:
The question here is whether a contract to extinguish or modify
a previous contract to sell immovable property must also be in
writing to be enforceable.

97. The court did not mention Torrey.
98. 513 So. 2d at 1172.
99. E.g., Salley v. Louviere, 183 La. 92, 98-99, 162 So. 811, 813 (1935) ("It is well
settled that [La. Civ. Code art. 2276 (1870)] does not forbid the proving by parol evidence
of a subsequent agreement to modify or to revoke a written agreement ....
) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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In the case of a modification which changes the terms of
the original contract, the answer depends on whether the modification ... would be required to be in writing if it were the
original contract. 1°°
Justice Lemmon bolsters his position with an example involving a written
contract to purchase two tracts of land. If this agreement is modified
to transfer three lots, it, of course, would have to be evidenced by a
writing-not because the original contract was written but because the
subsequent agreement calling for the sale of a third immovable would
not be enforceable unless in writing. The bench and the bar should use
this cogent argument, not inconsistent with the majority's view, in order
to steer future decisions on a straighter path.
Compromises and Formality
A contract of transaction or compromise, if not recited in open
court, must be reduced to writing. 101 The corollary to this requirement,
added by the courts, is that all of the parties to the agreement must
sign the writing. 0 2 As a general matter, this jurisprudential rule is
sensible, if for no other reason than to impress upon the parties the
significance and the finality of their actions. 03 Similarly, the Civil Code
provides, as a part of the law of obligations, that although written
agreements need not be prepared by the parties, they "must be signed
by them."' Nevertheless, there is an exception to this general directive:
a written agreement may be valid, though signed by but one party,
when the conduct of the nonsigning party demonstrates an acceptance
of the benefits of that agreement. 05 The courts have applied this ex6
ception even to contracts that, by law, must be in writing.1

100.
101.

513 So. 2d at 1173 (Lemmon, J.,concurring).
La. Civ. Code art. 3071:
A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or more persons,
who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by
mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on, and which every one of
them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.
This contract must be either reduced into writing or recited in open court
and capable of being transcribed from the record of the proceeding. The agreement recited in open court confers upon each of them the right of judicially
enforcing its performance, although its substance may thereafter be written in
a more convenient form.
102. E.g., Felder v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 405 So. 2d 521, 523 (La. 1981).

103. A compromise has the effect of a judgment. La. Civ. Code art. 3078.
104. Id. art. 1837.
105. E.g., Dobbins v. Hodges, 23 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1945); Saunders v. Bolden, 155
La. 136, 140, 98 So. 867, 869 (1923). See La. Civ. Code art. 1837 comment (b).
106. E.g., Neblett v. Placid Oil Co., 257 So. 2d 167, 170 (La. app. 3d Cir. 1971)
(transfer of immovable property); Succession of Jenkins, 91 So. 2d 416, 419 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1956) (same).
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The enforcement of an obligation evidenced by a writing that has
not been signed by all of the parties has been predicated on various
theories: tacit acceptance;' 7 estoppel; 08 and confirmation or ratification. °9 Although each of these grounds appear to justify enforcement
of a transaction or compromise that has been signed by only one party,
the first circuit's decision in Willett v. Price"l is to the contrary.
Willett involves the second lawsuit arising out of a property dispute
between Joe Johnson and the children of his former wife. In the first
action, the parties confected a compromise: Mr. Johnson would relinquish his claims of ownership in the property and the children, in return,
would discontinue the litigation and grant him a usufruct over the
property for life. All parties, except two of the four children, signed
the agreement. After the death of Mr. Johnson, his own children sought
to retain possession of the property. The trial court held that they were
bound by their father's compromise, even though two of the opposing
parties had not signed the writing. Apparently, the trial court found
that all the parties to the compromise had abided by its terms and had
fulfilled their respective obligations,"' and then based its decision on
estoppel or ratification or confirmation." 2 On appeal, the first circuit
reversed, citing the maxim that all parties must sign a transaction or
compromise." 3 According to the court, the cases supporting this rule
were indistinguishable from the matter before it, and the Civil Code
articles dealing with ratification and confirmation simply were inappli4
cable."
Unfortunately, the facts recounted in the Willett opinion do not
convey enough information about the actions taken by the nonsigning
parties after the compromise to permit an accurate determination of
whether the result is just. Nevertheless, the court's short shrift of the
possibility of confirmation or ratification is lamentable. An obligation
that is unenforceable because of a relative nullity may nevertheless be
made effective by a confirmation or ratification." 5 Actually, the proper

107. Neblett, 257 So. 2d at 170.
108. E.g., Succession of Ferrill, 166 La. 479, 485, 117 So. 562, 564 (1928); Central
Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Canulette Shipbuilding Co., 195 So. 114, 116 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1940).
109. E.g., Culverhouse v. Marx, 39 La. Ann 809, 2 So. 607, 608 (1887).
110. 515 So. 2d 477 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 516 So. 2d 367 (1988).
111. Id. at 479.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 478-79 (citing Felder v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 405 So. 2d 521 (La. 1981));
Guidry v. Bowers, 458 So. 2d 933 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Allan E. Amundson, Inc.
v. Hoppmeyer, 442 So. 2d 1254 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983); Union Producing Co. v.
Schneider, 131 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961)).

114. Id. at 479 (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 1842 (confirmation) & 1843 (ratification)).
115.

La. Civ. Code arts. 1842 & 1843.
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term in this situation is confirmation, not ratification; the former deals
with all relative nullities, while the latter concerns only the nullity that
arises when an obligation is incurred on another's behalf without authority. 1 16 A confirmation may result even tacitly, for example, from a
voluntary performance of the obligation. 1 7 By contrast, a party may
not confirm a contract that suffers from a defect rendering it absolutely
null." 8 With these standards in mind, implicit in Willett v. Price is the
decision that the failure of all parties to sign a transaction or compromise
leaves it an absolutely null document.
This implication, however, is inconsistent with the legislation. According to article 2030 of the Civil Code, "[a] contract is absolutely
null when it violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a
contract is illicit or immoral." In contrast, article 2031 provides that
"[a] contract is relatively null when it violates a rule intended for the
protection of private parties, as when a party lacked capacity or did
not give free consent at the time the contract was made." The lack of
a signature on a transaction or compromise agreement does not implicate
any rule of public order. Fundamentally, the writing requirement for
transactions is evidentiary; it does not render the transaction "[a] solemn
contract for which the writing is an essential formality."" 9 Thus, the
writing requirement, like other demands of proof, should be viewed as
a rule "intended for the protection of the private parties," in the words
of article 2031 of the Civil Code. To illustrate-, although a transfer of
immovable property that is not perfected in writing is "null,"' 20 the
defect is merely relative; the parties may validate the agreement by
certain confirming acts.' 2'
Moreover, the jurisprudence does not support the conclusion that
a compromise not signed by one of the parties is an absolute nullity.
In none of the cases cited by and relied upon by the court in Willett
was there evidence that the nonsigning parties actually accepted the

116. Id. Although the court referred to the inapplicability of ratification, its mention
of both articles 1842 and 1843, and its citation to former article 2272 of the Civil Code
of 1870 (encompassing both confirmation and ratification), indicates that the panel actually
rejected both concepts.
117. La. Civ. Code art. 1842.
118. Id. art. 2030.
119. 2 M. Planiol, Trait6 tl6mentaire de Droit Civil No. 2291 (La. St. L. Inst. trans.
1959); see Felder v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 405 So. 2d 521, 523 (the writing requirement
"is placed in the code to insure proper proof of extra-judicial agreements").
120. La. Civ. Code art. 2440.
121. Id. art. 1839:
A transfer of immovable property must be made by authentic act or by act
under private signature. Nevertheless, an oral transfer is valid between the parties
when the property has been actually delivered and the transferor recognizes the
transfer when interrogated on oath.
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benefits of the purported compromise and abided by its terms. 122 In
addition, the court overlooked two analogous decisions: Succession of
23
Ferrell1
and Culverhouse v. Marx.!24 In both instances the supreme
court held that a compromise, not authorized by or signed by one of
the parties, may be, nonetheless, ratified or confirmed.' 25 In Ferrell the
court specifically rejected the argument that the failure of one party to
26
authorize her signature rendered the compromise "an absolute nullity."'1
Although Willett is analytically unsound, courts may follow it because of the clear-cut simplicity of its holding: if all necessary signatures
are not included on the writing evidencing the transaction, there is no
compromise. That would be unfortunate.

122. See Willett, 515 So. 2d 477. Indeed, in Guidry v. Bowers, 458 So. 2d 933 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1984), and in Allan E. Amundson, Inc. v. Hoppmeyer, 442 So. 2d 1254
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), the reported facts suggest that the parties had not achieved
agreements of compromise, much less a perfection or completion of any transaction.
123. 166 La. 479, 117 So. 562 (1928).
124. 39 La. Ann. 802, 2 So. 607 (1887).
125. Ferrell, 166 La. at 484-85, 117 So. at 564; Culverhouse, 39 La. Ann. at 811, 2
So. at 608.
126. 166 La. at 484, 117 So. at 563.

